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INTRODUCTION 
 Salazar and his wife Nikki drove Steve to Cottonwood Heights where 
Steve jumped a fence, kicked in a basement door, and stole prescription pills, 
money, jewelry and other items from a home. A witness (Witness), saw Steve 
run from the home to Salazar’s car, jump in, and then watched as the car sped 
away. Witness called police and followed the car. When Salazar saw Witness 
behind him, he sped up and drove recklessly until Witness gave up his 
pursuit. Eventually, a detective (Detective), responding to the burglary, 
stopped Salazar’s car. A jury convicted Salazar of burglary and theft. 
 The issue on appeal is the admissibility of Nikki’s post-stop statements 
to Detective. By the time of Salazar’s trial, Nikki had died. But the trial court 
-2- 
allowed Detective to testify what Nikki had told him: that Nikki and Salazar 
had given their friend, Steve, a ride to Cottonwood Heights, Steve got out of 
the car, came back to the car, and they then went to a 7-Eleven where Steve 
asked Nikki to throw away some prescription pills, which she did. 
 Salazar complains that Nikki’s statements were inadmissible under the 
Confrontation Clause. The State agrees: Nikki’s statements were testimonial 
in nature—taken by police officers in the course of interrogations; Nikki did 
not appear at trial; and Salazar had no prior opportunity to cross examine 
her.  
 But reversal is not warranted here because Nikki’s statements were not 
important to the State’s case and were cumulative of, and corroborated by, 
the other, admissible evidence, namely: Witness’s testimony (about Salazar’s 
suspicious and reckless driving), Steve’s testimony (including his confession 
that he told Salazar that he had “stole[n] stuff” from the home), Salazar’s 
statements (including his admission that he “assumed that [Steve] had stolen 
something”), surveillance video (showing Nikki, in eyesight of Salazar, 
throwing away the bag of pills at 7-Eleven), and the bag of pills recovered 
from the 7-Eleven. This admissible evidence overwhelmingly supported 
Salazar’s convictions and rendered any error harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt.    
-3- 
 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
 Was the admission of Nikki’s post-stop statements harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt? 
 Standard of Review. “Whether testimony was admitted in violation of 
defendant’s right to confrontation is a question of law, which [this Court] 
reviews for correctness.” State v. Calliham, 2002 UT 86, ¶42, 55 P.3d 573. 
“Notwithstanding [an] error by the trial court, [this Court] will not reverse a 
conviction if [it] finds that the error was harmless.” Id. ¶45 (citation omitted).  
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Summary of relevant facts.1 
Salazar waits while Steve steals 
 One July afternoon, Salazar and his wife, Nikki, drove Steve to a home 
in Cottonwood Heights. R423–24, 427, 487–89. There, Salazar stopped his 
white, 90s Honda Accord and Steve jumped out of the back seat, went to the 
front door, knocked, and, when no one answered, hopped a fence to the 
backyard. R417–18, 452, 465–66, 449, 490, 509; SE1–2 (showing the home).  
                                              
1  Because this is an appeal from a jury verdict, the State presents the 
facts in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, addressing conflicting 
evidence only to the extent necessary to understand the issues on appeal. See 
State v. Bond, 2015 UT 88, ¶3 n.2, 361 P.3d 104. 
-4- 
 Steve found a basement door, kicked it in (triggering the alarm system), 
went inside, and rifled through the homeowners’ belongings, throwing and 
scattering clothes and furniture. R490–91; SE3–6 (showing items scattered 
throughout house); SE7–8 (showing broken back door).2 He grabbed a bag of 
pills (hoping they were prescription pain medications), Ray Ban sunglasses, 
a money clip with cash, a microcassette recorder, and women’s rings and 
necklaces. R403–04, 492; SE3–6, 9–10 (showing inside of home and some of 
items stolen). After three or four minutes, Steve rushed back to Salazar’s 
Honda with the loot in his arms, jumped in the back seat, and told Salazar, 
“[H]urry up.” R492–93. 
Salazar drives suspiciously 
 Outside, a witness (Witness), who had been waiting in his truck for his 
wife, saw a white, early-90s Honda, with a black leather bra that caught his 
attention. R465–66. It drove slowly, ten miles an hour or so, up-and-down the 
street and not in its normal traffic lane; instead, it drove up “against the curb,” 
but never parked. R466–68, 472. The driver appeared Hispanic and his head 
was shaved, identical to Salazar, and his seat was tilted way back. R469. The 
female passenger had darker hair, like Nikki’s. Id.   
                                              
2  It is not clear from the record if this was a silent alarm or made some 
type of noise.  
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 After the car twice moseyed along the same street, each time hugging 
the curb, Witness saw a white man race from between the houses; the Honda 
rapidly accelerated to meet him. R468, 470. The man jumped in the back seat 
and the Honda sped off. R470, 493.  
Salazar drives recklessly 
 To Witness, something felt wrong. R470. So he followed the Honda, 
called the police, and described the vehicle and its occupants. Id.  
 Salazar saw Witness’s truck following them. R425, 471, 493. Steve told 
Salazar that he had “stole[n]” some things from the home and that the truck 
“might be somebody trying to get their stuff back.” R493–94.3 Abruptly, the 
Honda accelerated and drove “erratic” and “reckless.” R416, 471. Witness 
decided his pursuit was no longer safe and stopped. R471.  
 After losing Witness’s truck, Salazar stopped at a 7-Eleven for some 
gas. R495–97. There, Steve handed Nikki the prescription pills that he had 
just stolen and asked her to throw them away, which she did, and then the 
trio left. R496–97; SE1a.  
                                              
3  Steve first testified that he told Salazar that he “stole some stuff” 
when he saw Witness’s truck. R494. He repeated this claim three times. Id. He 
then changed his story to say that he told Salazar about stealing items at some 
point after they saw Witness’s truck. Id. Then he changed his story again, this 
time saying he never told Salazar that he stole items. R496–97. The details of 
Steve’s ever-changing testimony are provided in subsection I.D.  
-6- 
Detective stops Salazar 
 A detective (Detective), in an unmarked police car, heard the reports of 
the burglary, including a description of the suspects and their car. R414–16. 
As he made his way to the crime scene, he spotted a car with three occupants 
that matched the description given by dispatch. R415–17. He followed the car 
and then stopped it. R417–18, 452. 
 Witness, who was still in the area, joined Detective and confirmed that 
the Honda and its three occupants were the ones he saw fleeing Cottonwood 
Heights. R420. 
Detective interviews Salazar, Nikki, and Steve 
 Although no one was under arrest at that point, Detective interviewed 
Salazar, Steve, and Nikki and each waived their Miranda rights. R421.   
 Salazar told Detective that he gave Steve a ride to the home, that Steve 
got out of the car for a “few minutes,” and came back “carrying some items.” 
R423–24. When asked what Steve was doing at the home, Salazar responded 
that he “assumed that [Steve] had stolen something.” R427, 462. He also 
admitted that as they left, they saw a truck following them and that he 
“dr[ove] a little faster in an attempt to lose the tailing vehicle.” R425. 
 Nikki largely confirmed Salazar’s account, but added some additional 
detail regarding their activities after Steve left the house and got back in the 
-7- 
car. See R449–51. Nikki later died—before having the opportunity to testify 
in the case. See R92, 445. 
 Steve told Detective a different story. He said that Salazar and Nikki 
had just picked him up at a 7-Eleven. R509. But when confronted with 
Salazar’s and Nikki’s stories, Steve confessed that he went to the home, broke 
in, and stole several items. Id.   
Surveillance Video and Recovery of Victim’s Prescription Pills 
 Officers secured the 7-Eleven surveillance video from when Salazar, 
Nikki, and Steve were at the store. It showed that while Salazar pumped gas 
on the driver’s side, Nikki exited the passenger side and walked to an 
adjacent garbage can. SE1a. Before getting to the garbage can, she stopped, 
turned around and returned to the car. Id. When she got back to the car, 
Salazar was leaning his head into the car through the open door as a 
passenger (Steve) reached out and handed Nikki something. Id. Nikki then 
resumed walking to the garbage can and threw something away. Id. When 
Nikki returned, Salazar was still leaning his head into the car. Id. After staying 
in the car for a few seconds, Nikki got out and walked to the same garbage 
can a second time, again throwing something away. Id.  
-8- 
 Later that same day, the police recovered prescription pills with the 
homeowner’s name on them from the same 7-Eleven garbage seen in the 
surveillance video. R450–51, SE11. 
 The State charged Salazar with burglary and theft. R1–3.  
 Steve provides new details at trial 
 At trial, Steve provided details that he had not given to Detective. Steve 
said that he was living with his sister the day of the burglary because he had 
been “kicked out of the place [he] was staying.” R487–88. That morning, his 
sister’s friend Nikki stopped by along with her husband, Salazar. R488. Steve 
said that he had known Nikki for a short time but had only met Salazar that 
morning. R488, 502. He said that he asked Nikki for a ride “to a house that 
[he] was renting and [that he] needed to get [his] stuff from there.” R489.  
 Salazar and Nikki gave Steve a ride, and he broke into the home and 
stole items. R489–91. When they left the home, Steve said he saw Witness’s 
truck following them and told Salazar that it might be some “guys [coming] 
to beat [him] up because [he] got [his] stuff out of the house.” R494. That’s 
when Salazar sped up and lost the truck. R494–95.  
 When they stopped at 7-Eleven, Steve admitted that he asked Nikki to 
throw away a bag of prescription pills he had stolen from the home, which 
she did. R496. He said that Salazar was inside the store when he asked her to 
-9- 
do so, but the surveillance video showed Salazar was leaning inside the car 
when Steve handed Nikki the pills. Compar R496 with SE1a. Steve testified 
that Salazar knew nothing about his burglary plans.  R506. 
B. Summary of proceedings and disposition of the court. 
 Before the trial, Nikki died. R92, 445. At trial, over Salazar’s objections 
on Confrontation Clause and hearsay grounds, the State introduced Nikki’s 
hearsay statements to Detective. R427–46, 485. The trial court denied Salazar’s 
objection. It concluded that admitting the statements did not violate the 
Confrontation Clause because Salazar could confront these statements by 
testifying himself or calling Steve to testify. R445–46. It also concluded that 
because Nikki was unavailable, and the statements were against her interest, 
her hearsay statements were admissible under evidence rule 804(b)(3). R445–
47. 
 The jury convicted Salazar of burglary and theft. R552. For burglary, 
the court sentenced Salazar to one-to-fifteen years in prison, which it then 
suspended, and then placed on Salazar on probation which included an order 
that he serve 180 days in jail. R220–21. For theft, the Court sentenced Salazar 
to 180 days in jail, which was to run concurrently with his burglary sentence. 
R221. He was then placed on 36 months of AP&P-supervised probation. Id. 
Salazar timely appeals. R227.  
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 Salazar is correct: Nikki’s statements were inadmissible under the 
Confrontation Clause because they were testimonial, and he did not have a 
prior opportunity to cross examine her.  
 But reversal is not warranted here because Nikki’s statements were not 
important to the State’s case and were cumulative of, and corroborated by, 
the other, admissible evidence, namely: Witness’s testimony (about Salazar’s 
suspicious and reckless driving), Steve’s testimony (including his confession 
that he told Salazar that he had “stole[n] stuff” from the home), Salazar’s 
statements (including his admission that he “assumed that [Steve] had stolen 
something”), surveillance video (showing Nikki, in eyesight of Salazar, 
throwing away the bag of pills at 7-Eleven), and the bag of pills recovered 
from the 7-Eleven. This admissible evidence overwhelmingly supported 
Salazar’s convictions and rendered any error harmless beyond a reasonable 




Nikki’s statements were harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
 The State concedes that admission of Nikki’s statements to Detective 
violated Salazar’s Sixth Amendment right to confront Nikki because her 
statements were testimonial in nature—“taken by police officers in the course 
of interrogations”; Nikki “did not appear at trial”; and Salazar had no “prior 
opportunity for cross-examination.” Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 
(2004). But reversal is not warranted because Nikki’s statements were 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.4 
 Where an error deprives defendants of their Sixth Amendment right of 
confrontation, reversal is not required when the error is harmless beyond a 
                                              
4  Salazar claims that the trial court also erred in admitting Nikki’s 
statements as statements against penal interest by an unavailable witness 
under rule 804(b)(3). Aplt.Brf.18–33. But because the State concedes that 
Nikki’s statements were erroneously admitted in violation of the 
Confrontation Clause, there is no need to address this alternative claim. As 
the State explains, any constitutional error in admitting the statements was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. And that showing more than satisfies 
that any error was harmless. As Salazar admits, “‘An erroneous decision to 
admit or exclude evidence . . . does not result in reversible error unless the 
error is harmful.’” Aplt.Bfr.28 (quoting State v. Webster, 2001 UT App 238, ¶38, 
32 P.3d 976 (cleaned up)). And such errors are harmful only where there is a 
reasonable likelihood of a different outcome. Id. This is a lower standard than 
the harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard that applies to Salazar’s 
Confrontation Clause claim. State v. Villareal, 889 P.2d 419, 425 (Utah 1995). 
And because Nikki’s statements are harmless beyond a reasonable doubt (see 
subsections I.A–D), they are necessarily harmless under this lesser standard. 
-12- 
reasonable doubt. Delaware v. Van Ardsall, 475 U.S. 673, 680–81, 684 (1986); 
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967); State v. Villareal, 889 P.2d 419, 425 
(Utah 1995); State v. Hackford, 737 P.2d 200, 204 (Utah 1987). It is the State’s 
burden to prove harmlessness. State v. Farnworth, 2018 UT App 23, ¶24, 414 
P.3d 1053. Whether an error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in any 
given case depends on a host of factors, including: (1) whether the testimony 
was cumulative; (2) whether the testimony is corroborated or contradicted by 
the other evidence; (3) the testimony’s importance; and (4) the overall 
strength of the State’s case. Van Ardsall, 475 U.S. at 684; Villareal, 889 P.2d at 
425–26.5 All these factors support a finding that the error in admitting Nikki’s 
statements to Detective was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  
A. Nikki’s statements are cumulative of other evidence. 
 “Where [the] evidence admitted in violation of defendant’s right to 
confrontation is merely cumulative, it may be deemed harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt.” Calliham, 2002 UT 86, ¶46 (citing Harrington v. California, 
395 U.S. 250, 253–54 (1969)); Farnworth, 2018 UT App 23, ¶31 (holding 
                                              
5 The Supreme Court in Van Ardsall held that “the extent of cross-
examination otherwise permitted” may also factor in a finding that a 
statement’s erroneous admission is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 475 
U.S. at 684. This factor is of no help in showing harmlessness here because 
Nikki did not testify at all and thus was not subject to any cross-examination 
that may have supported a finding of harmlessness.  
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confrontation error harmless where admitted evidence was cumulative of 
other record evidence). Such is the case here.  
 Nikki’s statements were cumulative of other evidence. For example, 
Nikki said that she and Salazar drove Steve to “an address on the east side” 
(R449); Salazar and Steve said the same thing. R423, 488–89. Nikki said that 
Steve “exited the car, came back to the car, and they left” (R449); Salazar, 
Steve, and Witness said the same thing. R423–25, 470, 489–90. Nikki said they 
stopped at a 7-Eleven (R449–50); Salazar and Steve said the same thing. R425, 
R495. Nikki said that Steve gave “her a bag of prescription pills and directed 
her to discard the pills in the garbage can at the 7-Eleven store”; and she told 
Detective the specific garbage can she used. R450–51. Steve confirmed that he 
asked Nikki to throw away “[a] bag of pills” at 7-Eleven. R496.   
 Salazar alleges just one of Nikki’s statements to Detective as non-
cumulative: that Nikki “just stated that they were driving around [in the 
neighborhood] with their friend.” R450–51 (emphasis added). Salazar 
contends on appeal that “nowhere else in the record” is there a “suggested 
. . . affiliation between [Steve] and the Salazars.” Aplt.Brf.16. But that’s not 
true. Steve testified on direct that Nikki knew his sister. R488. On cross-
examination he acknowledged that he knew Nikki as his sister’s “good 
friend[].” R502-03. Steve also explained that he knew Salazar “[t]hat day,” 
-14- 
and Nikki “[n]ot very long, just through [his] sister.” R502. R502-03. The point 
is—contrary to Salazar’s claim—there was evidence, apart from Nikki’s 
statements to Detective, that Steve had some affiliation with Nikki through 
his sister.  
 In short, Nikki’s statements to Detective added nothing to the evidence 
in this case. Her statements were “merely cumulative since others also 
testified to essentially the same facts.” State v. Oniskor, 510 P.2d 929, 931 (Utah 
1973); see State v. Chapman, 655 P.2d 1119, 1125 (Utah 1982) (holding that 
because testimony was “merely cumulative” of the testimony of others, it was 
“clearly harmless beyond a reasonable doubt”). This alone proves that 
Nikki’s statements were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
B. Nikki’s statements are corroborated. 
 The above, cumulative testimony also corroborates Nikki’s statements. 
But there was more corroborating evidence of what she told Detective. The 
State introduced 7-Eleven surveillance video capturing Nikki throwing items 
away in the garbage can that she described to Detective. SE1a. And on top of 
that, inside that same garbage can, the police recovered a bag of prescription 
pills with the name of the homeowner whose house the trio had burglarized. 
R450–51, SE11. In short, Nikki’s account to Detective was “supported by 
-15- 
independent evidence that is both credible and admissible.” Corroborated, 
Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).  
C. Nikki’s statements are unimportant. 
 Nor was Nikki’s passing and vague reference to Steve as a friend 
important. Detective testified that Nikki “just stated that they were driving 
around [in the neighborhood] with their friend.” R450–51. Salazar contends 
that Nikki’s “friend” statement was important because it invited the jury to 
infer that Salazar knew about Steve’s burglary plans. Aplt.Brf.16. But the 
“friend” statement was one word in a full-day, four-witness jury trial. And 
the prosecution never suggested to the jury that Salazar would know of 
Steve’s burglary plans because he was a friend. In fact, the prosecutor never 
referred to Steve as the Salazars’ friend—not in opening, closing, or in 
defending Salazar’s motion to dismiss.6 
 That’s because it didn’t matter. It was not an element of the crime. See 
Farnworth, 2018 UT App 23, ¶26. The State argued that Salazar was guilty 
based on his actions both before and after the burglary, his admission that he 
“assumed that [Steve] had stolen something” from the home, Steve’s 
                                              
6 Salazar’s counsel, on the other hand, referred to Steve and Nikki as 
“friends” three times. R397 (referring to Steve in opening as “Nikki’s friend”); 
R398 (referring to Steve in opening as a “friend of [Nikki’s].”); R541 (referring 
to Steve in closing as “friends with [Nikki’s] sister).  
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admission that he told Salazar that he had stolen “some stuff” from the home, 
and the pills that were thrown away at the 7-Eleven. See subsection I.D infra. 
That’s why the jury convicted him; not because of any friendship (or lack 
thereof) with Steve. And Salazar’s story—that he took Steve to get some of 
his belongings—did not become less believable because Steve was a friend or 
an acquaintance. Just because Nikki called Steve their “friend,” did not mean 
that they were close friends or longtime friends. It could be that they did meet 
only that morning and became fast friends.  
 Nor was admission at trial of Nikki’s statement important to proving 
that Steve asked Nikki to dispose of the stolen prescription pills. That’s 
because Steve confessed that he gave Nikki “[a] bag of pills” and asked her 
to throw them away at the 7-Eleven. R496. And, as discussed, the 7-Eleven 
surveillance video showed Nikki taking items from the car and throwing 
them in the garbage can while Salazar stood nearby. SE1a. And, later that 
day, in that same garbage can, the police recovered a bag of prescription pills 
with the homeowner’s name on them. R450–51, SE11.  
D. The State’s overall case was overwhelming. 
 Finally, where the properly admitted evidence is “‘so overwhelming 
that there is no likelihood whatsoever of a different result,’” as is the case 
here, the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Hackford, 737 P.2d at 
-17- 
205, n.3 (Utah 1987) (quoting State v. Scandrett, 468 P.2d 639, 643 (1970)); see 
Villareal, 889 P.2d at 426 (finding violation of confrontation right harmless 
where the evidence was overwhelming); United States v. Marquez, 898 F.3d 
1036, 1048 (10th Cir. 2018) (“A Confrontation Clause violation is harmless if 
it’s clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the properly admitted evidence is 
so overwhelming that the prejudicial effect of the improperly admitted 
evidence is insignificant by comparison.” (cleaned up)). 
 Here, Steve committed both burglary and theft. The only question was 
whether Salazar was also liable as a party to the offense. As a party to the 
offense, Salazar needed to act “with both the intent that the [burglary and 
theft] be committed and the intent to aid [Steve] in [their commission].” State 
v. Briggs, 2008 UT 75, ¶13, 197 P.3d 628. Here, Salazar’s intent may be inferred 
from his conduct both before and after the burglary, his admission that he 
assumed that Steve had stolen something, and Steve’s confession that he told 
Salazar that he burglarized the home. Id.; see State v. Steed, 2014 UT 16, ¶21, 
325 P.3d 87. 
 Salazar’s actions both before and after the burglary prove his intent. 
Salazar drove Steve to the home, watched as Steve got out, knocked on the 
front door, and, when no one answered, jumped over the fence. R423, 489–
90, 509. Instead of parking in the driveway, or in front of the home, and 
-18- 
waiting for Steve, as would be expected if he truly believed that Steve was 
there to legally get his own belongings, he drove slowly, up-and-down the 
street, hugging the curb, never parking, and watching for Steve’s return. 
R467–68, 472–73.  
 He then saw Steve running from the home with several items in his 
arms—prescription pills, a money clip with cash in it, Ray Ban sunglasses, a 
microcassette recorder, and women’s rings and necklaces. R403, 406, 424, 470, 
473, 492.7 Instead of keeping his slow, deliberate pace, Salazar suddenly 
accelerated to meet Steve, Steve quickly hopped in and said, “hurry up,” and 
Salazar raced off. R470, 492. While driving away, Salazar noticed Witness’s 
truck following them, so he drove faster, erratically, and recklessly to ditch 
it. R416, 425, 471. When he had successfully done so, he pulled into a 7-Eleven 
where his wife, Nikki, within Salazar’s eyesight, threw away a bag full of 
prescription pills with the homeowner’s name on them. R496, SE1a.  
 Salazar also admitted to Detective that he “assumed that [Steve] had 
stolen something” from the home. R427.  
                                              
7  Salazar admitted that he saw Steve carrying “some items” in his arms, 
but there is no testimony about what exactly he saw. R424. However, these 
items are the ones that were stolen from the home and are the items that Steve 
must have been carrying. R403–06. 
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 On top of this is Steve’s confession that he told Salazar, when they saw 
Witness’s truck following them, that he had stolen property from the home:  
Q:  . . . . Did you say anything to [Salazar] or Nikki when you 
saw [Witness’s] truck? 
 
A:  No, sir. I said that they might—they might be somebody trying 
to get their stuff back. 
 
Q:  Stuff back? 
 
A:  Yeah, like, something I stole from them.  
 
Q:  Okay. So you told Nikki and/or [Salazar], that people in the 
truck may be trying to get you because they might be trying to 
get the stuff back that you stole from them? 
 
A:  Yes, sir. 
 
Q:  Okay. So you told [Salazar] and Nikki right then and there 
and then that they stole stuff? 
 
A:  That I stole some stuff, yes. 
 
R494 (emphasis added). In sum, Steve confirmed—three times—that he told 
Salazar that he “stole some stuff.” Id. 
 True, right after repeatedly admitting that he told Salazar about the 
stolen items, Steve changed his story: 
A:  No, I didn’t tell them at that exact moment that I stole 
something. 
 
Q:  Okay. I’m talking about that exact moment. 
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A:  No, I didn’t tell them I stole something. 
 
Id. (emphasis added). But by saying not “at that exact moment,” Steve clearly 
implied that at some point he did tell Salazar. Id. Even Salazar’s counsel 
believed as much; that’s why he asked at what point Steve told Salazar about 
the burglary. Yet again, Steve changed his story, this time claiming that he 
never told Salazar about the burglary:  
Q:  Okay. Earlier you said that—that you did admit to [Salazar] 
and Nikki that in fact, you did steal something from that house. 
Had you told them [when you were stopped by police] or did 
you tell them later? 
 
A:  I didn’t tell them at all. I didn’t tell them I stole nothing. . . . 
 
R497 (emphasis added).  
 So depending on which of Steve’s three different versions you believe, 
he told Salazar about the burglary (1) before Salazar drove recklessly to ditch 
Witness, (2) sometime later, or (3) never told him.  
 Salazar, of course, claims that the third version is the most believable. 
Aplt.Brf.16–17. According to him, when they saw Witness’s truck following 
them, Steve gave a “reasonable explanation”: it might be some guys looking 
to beat him up “because [he] got [his] stuff out of the house.” R494, 497. But 
that makes no sense. First, there was no testimony that Witness was driving 
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aggressive or reckless as he followed Salazar—as you would expect if 
someone was following you to “beat [you] up.” R494. In fact, the opposite is 
true: as soon as Salazar sped up, Witness stopped his pursuit. Second, if 
Salazar was truly concerned, about getting beaten up, he could have called 
the police or at least asked some questions of Steve about why these guys 
would want to beat him up for getting his own stuff back, but he did neither. 
Third, and perhaps most important, why would a bunch of guys be looking 
to beat Steve up for taking his own belongings? There is nothing in the record 
to show that it was reasonable to believe that someone would be looking to 
beat Steve up for taking his own stuff. 
 For these, or other reasons, the jury clearly did not believe Steve’s third 
version. In fact, it clearly did not believe any of Steve’s testimony, which is 
what Salazar’s defense and appeal hinge on. See Aplt.Brf.16–18 (pointing to 
Steve’s testimony to argue the State’s evidence was not overwhelming). 
 Salazar’s suspicious driving while waiting for Steve, his reckless 
driving to ditch Witness, his admission that he “assumed” Steve had stolen 
items from the home, Steve’s initial admission that he told Salazar that he 
“stole some stuff” from the home, surveillance video showing Nikki 
throwing away the prescription pills within Salazar’s eyesight, and the 
prescription pills recovered from the garbage can, overwhelmingly support 
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Salazar’s conviction and make any error in the admission of Nikki’s 
statements—which did not strongly inculpate Salazar—harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt.   
CONCLUSION 
 In sum, any error in admitting Nikki’s hearsay statement to Detective 
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and thus, this Court should affirm.  
 Respectfully submitted on January 18, 2019. 
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